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ABSTRACT. The south Indian city of Bangalore provides a challenging yet representative context within which to examine issues of
governance of urban social-ecological commons. The city was once famous for its numerous large water bodies, which have witnessed
tremendous encroachment and pollution in recent years. These water bodies, called tanks or lakes, were typically managed by adjacent
village communities but are now administered by a number of government departments involved with aspects of lake management,
with multiple overlapping jurisdictions. The public’s perceptions of lakes has also changed with urbanization, transitioning from
community spaces valued for water and cultural services to urban recreational spaces used largely by joggers and walkers. We focus on
a set of seven lakes located in the urbanizing peripheral areas of southeast Bangalore. Some water bodies have been restored and
managed effectively by newly forged collaborations between citizens and local government. Others are extremely polluted, and some
have completely dried up and have been encroached. We use a social-ecological system (SES) framework to investigate why some
locations have been successful in negotiating changes in governance from community-based systems to state management following
urbanization, whereas other lakes have deteriorated. We use seven second-tier SES variables that were associated with self-organization
in previous research: size of resource system, number of actors, leadership, social capital, importance of resource, existence of
operational-choice rules, and existence of informal mechanisms for monitoring. We also include three third-tier variables previously
identified as important in urban lake commons in Bangalore: scale and type of pre-existing pollution, exclusion of socioeconomic
groups from the planning process, and networking with government organizations. We use this subset of 10 variables to examine social
outcomes of the lakes, which we define as the extent of collective action by residents working together for lake restoration and ecological
outcomes based on the ecological condition of the lakes. Collective action was low in only one of seven lakes, which challenges the
presumption that citizens will not organize efforts to cope with common-pool problems. However, only two of seven lakes were highly
successful in regard to both the extent of collective action and the level of ecological performance. While one lake was small and the
other moderate in size, these two cases shared similar ranking in all other variables. Both lakes were polluted at a relatively low level
compared with the other lakes, and in both cases, the leaders of local groups were able to network with government officials to clean
up the lakes. Unfortunately, the challenge of cleaning up urban lakes after many decades of pollution is very difficult without effective
interaction with various governmental units. Our analysis illustrates the usefulness of the SES framework in examining the combination
of variables that makes a collective difference in affecting the outcomes of collective action and ecological performance. Our findings
illustrate the need for polycentric arrangements in urban areas, whereby local residents are able to organize in diverse ways that reflect
their own problems and capabilities, but can also work jointly with larger-scale governments to solve technical problems requiring
changes in major engineering works as well as acquiring good scientific information. Such arrangements can reduce transaction costs
for city governments by actively engaging local communities in processes that include coordination of collective activities, design of
inclusive and locally suited ecological and social restoration goals, and planning and enforcement of regulations limiting access and
withdrawal. At a time when many city governments are facing financial and administrative challenges that limit their ability to regulate
and maintain urban commons, models of public-community partnerships could provide more inclusive, equitable, and sustainable
institutional alternatives. This is an aspect that needs significant further consideration because the attention of most urban planners
and scholars has remained on privatization while studies of successful instances of cooperative action in the urban context remain few
and far between.
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INTRODUCTION
We are witnessing an era of large-scale urbanization. More than
half  of the world’s population now lives in cities, and human
settlements continue to expand rapidly in area and increase in
population density across all continents (United Nations 2011).
Yet the most dramatic changes in urbanization are set to take
place largely in developing countries, in particular, in the
continents of Africa and Asia (Montgomery 2008, Seto et al.
2011). Rural to urban transformations in these regions of the
world are associated with extensive land-use modification coupled
with dramatic increases in consumption levels (Huang et al. 2010).
These transformations lead to ecological degradation as well as
high levels of pressure on ecosystem services (DeFries and Pandey
2010), with obvious social consequences (Faeth et al. 2012).
Compounding these challenges is the mismatch between current
institutions and ecological dynamics, a gap that is widening due
to urbanization and the consequent increased separation between
humans and nature in cities (Folke et al. 2007, Colding 2012). 
Of the multiple ecosystem services supplied by urban areas, fresh
water is especially critical, indeed essential, for human survival in
cities across the globe (Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity
2011). However, this resource is especially affected by
urbanization. Thus, by 2050, seasonal water shortages are
predicted for as many as 3 billion urban dwellers across the globe
(McDonald et al. 2011). Institutions and governance will play key
roles in ensuring better adaptation to these challenges, yet these
have been explored little compared to technical and engineering
solutions (Huang et al. 2010, Economics of Ecosystems and
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Biodiversity 2011). Surface water bodies such as freshwater lakes
can be critical in this context, for instance, in India. Many
freshwater ecosystems such as lakes, rivers, and wetlands are
managed as common-pool resources in rural areas across the
world (Ostrom 2007). Although their ownership has (often fairly
recently) been transferred to state authorities, many urban
commons such as wetlands, lakes, and forests continue to be
accessed by local communities for traditional cultural and
livelihood uses as well as by recent urban migrants for aesthetic
and recreational purposes (D’Souza and Nagendra 2011, Garnett
2012). In most cases, users of urban commons lack formal
ownership over the lands they access, but frequently have access
to other bundles of property rights; that is, withdrawal,
management, and/or exclusion (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001,
Colding 2012). 
Urban commons play an especially critical role in governance in
recently urbanized areas at the peri-urban fringe, especially in
developing countries. Reliance on ecosystem resources is
frequently higher in peri-urban and rural areas compared to cities
(DeFries and Pandey 2010). However, the persistence of
ecological commons in the urban fringe has been challenging, in
large part because of the tendency of city municipalities and
government agencies to centralize their control over natural
resources and ecosystems. This is ironic, as many authors (e.g.,
Colding 2012) have argued that urban commons are very
important, not just for their capacity to provide improved local
ecosystem governance, but also for their capacity to bridge the
human-nature gap in cities and to foster a culture of
environmental stewardship. 
Challenges of governance are especially critical in peri-urban
fringe areas, which constitute unique social-ecological
transitional spaces with a mix of rural and urban characteristics
(Simon 2008). Peri-urban areas constitute centers of increased
social heterogeneity, often leading to fragmentation of existing
social networks (Nicholls 2008). Peri-urban residents often have
to deal with a confusing mix of rural and urban institutions,
policies, and laws, where the locus of control over local commons
shifts to a different level (that of the city municipality),
simultaneously creating an environment in which opportunities
for dialog and cooperation between different levels of government
are scarce (Narain and Nischal 2007). Urbanization in the
periphery of cities thus frequently leads to periods of “regulatory
slippage” (Foster 2011) during periods of rapid growth, coupled
with insufficient administrative and financial infrastructure, when
city governments face challenges of reduced capacity to control
access to commons and regulate overuse. 
In the fringe of cities, severe ecological and environmental
challenges are thus often compounded by a widespread lack of
implementation of planning norms and ineffective urban
governance (Aguilar 2008). Yet ironically, efforts at conservation
can be far more cost-effective and easier to implement in these
locations, where land prices are often considerably less inflated
than in the city, and where the trajectory of degradation is often
recent and easier to reverse (Theobald 2004). Peri-urban areas
thus also constitute areas of opportunity, where development has
not yet taken place to its fullest expected extent, and where de
facto governance of urban commons is still likely to vest with
local communities, providing scope for better institutional
governance (Colding et al. 2006, Elmqvist et al. 2013). 
Thus, scholars and public officials interested in developing better
institutions and policies for the governance of ecological
commons in growing urban areas face a serious challenge because
“a formal structure for institutional analysis has not been
developed for urban ecosystem research” (Mincey et al. 2013:554).
Addressing the complex problems of urban and rural resources
at multiple scales cannot rely on one discipline alone because the
causes and consequences of ecosystem degradation and recovery
are both ecological and social. An interdisciplinary framework
provides a common language that can be used when trying to
understand the patterns of interactions and outcomes occurring
in complex systems. The social-ecological system (SES)
framework developed by Ostrom (2007, 2009) can be very useful
for such analyses because it provides a common analytical
language to diagnose the factors that are important for addressing
the complex problems of urban and rural ecosystem management
at multiple scales. The framework has been designed to apply to
SESs that could range from lakes in Wisconsin (Brock and
Carpenter 2007) and lobster fisheries in Maine (Wilson et al. 2007)
to water institutions in Asia (Meinzen-Dick 2007), forests in
Nepal (Nagendra 2007), and community-based conservation
efforts across the world (Berkes 2007). 
The utility of the SES framework for diagnosing the complex
challenges related to the sustainable management of peri-urban
and urban commons has not been explored thus far. Here, we
provide an application of the SES framework to an urban context
in India, a country experiencing particularly rapid urbanization
in recent decades, with major impacts on ecosystems (DeFries
and Pandey 2010, Nagendra et al. 2013). Urbanization-related
changes in land use have led to pollution and degradation of lakes,
concomitant with reduction in the social dependence of local
communities on these freshwater resources, in many Indian cities,
including Bangalore, Hyderabad, and Chennai (D’Souza and
Nagendra 2011, Reddy et al. 2012, Merugu and Seetharaman
2013). We examine the effects of diverse structural variables on
interactions and outcomes achieved related to seven urban lakes
located at the fringe of the Indian city of Bangalore, an incipient
megapolis that has undergone particularly rapid urbanization in
recent years (Sudhira and Gururaja 2012). 
Using the SES framework, we identify the combinations of
variables associated with higher levels of self-organization and
improved environmental conditions of a lake, relating these to
studies using the SES framework in other contexts, as well as to
other research on peri-urban and urban ecosystems. Based on our
findings, we speculate about the challenges and opportunities for
further research on the issue of urban collective action using the
multi-tier SES framework.
STUDY AREA
The south Indian city of Bangalore has become famous
internationally in recent years for its information-technology
companies, even spawning a new word, “Bangalored,” to indicate
layoffs of multi-national employees whose jobs have moved to
India. The city is India’s third largest metropolis, with a
population > 8.4 million and an average annual population
growth rate of 4.7% between 2001 and 2011. Bangalore has a
much longer history than many realize, however, with evidence
of human inhabitation at least as far back as 1000 BCE and an
unbroken continuity of occupation since the early 16th century
(Rice 1897a,b, Annaswamy 2003). 
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Although Bangalore was once known for its wide tree-lined
avenues, historic parks, and expansive water bodies, these natural
resources have witnessed tremendous pressure in recent decades
with the encroachment and pollution of water bodies, the felling
of thousands of trees, and conversion of open areas and parks
into commercial, industrial, and residential settlements (Nair
2005, Sudhira et al. 2007, Nagendra 2010, Nagendra and Gopal
2010). The expansion of the city’s boundaries has also
transformed the land-use patterns and governance of many of
these natural spaces, with particular effects on water bodies. There
were once thousands of reservoirs in the area surrounding
Bangalore, which were used for a number of purposes, including
agriculture, fishing, cattle washing, drinking, and domestic uses
(Buchanan [1807] 1999). These water bodies, called tanks or lakes,
were created by damming rain-fed streams to create networks of
freshwater reservoirs topographically distributed throughout the
region (Rice 1897a). 
For centuries, these lakes were typically managed by adjacent
village communities, with specific families and groups responsible
for particular maintenance tasks such as desilting and
maintenance of canals and tank bunds, and having access rights
for fishing, irrigation, grazing, collection of fodder, and other
natural resources. These rights and duties varied spatially and
temporally across lakes and networks, with financial support
sometimes provided by local elites, including temples and local
chieftains (Buchanan [1807] 1999, Rice 1897a). Coerced labor was
often used for the more labor-intensive tasks of tank construction
and maintenance, and the spatial distribution of head- and tail-
end users reflected the existing, highly unequal social hierarchies
of the times (Shah 2008). 
Formal, uniform, and prescriptive rules replaced these
specialized, spatio-temporal, adaptive rules by the end of the 19th
century, when the British introduced irrigation and revenue
departments. The number of government departments involved
with aspects of lake management has now expanded to include
the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA), Bangalore Water
Supply and Sewerage Board, Department of Fisheries,
Department of Minor Irrigations, Ecology and Environment
Department, Karnataka Forest Department, Lake Development
Authority, Karnataka State Pollution Control Board, and Bruhat
Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike (BBMP, Bangalore’s municipal
government), with multiple overlapping jurisdictions (Gowda and
Sridhara 2007, D’Souza and Nagendra 2011). The public’s
perceptions of lakes have also changed with urbanization,
transitioning from community spaces valued for water and
cultural services to urban recreational spaces used largely by
joggers and walkers (Srinivas 2004, D’Souza and Nagendra
2011). 
Currently, > 200 lakes are located within greater Bangalore
(Bruhat Bangalore Mahanagara Palike 2010) while a much larger
network of lakes surrounds the city at its periphery (Fig. 1). Rapid
changes in land use have taken place around lake and wetland
areas (D’Souza and Nagendra 2011); water bodies have been
encroached by partial or total filling and conversion to urban land
use, subjected to drying because of disruptions in drainage
networks, and polluted from domestic and industrial waste
(Environment Support Group 2009). Despite expensive
government restoration projects, many lakes continue to be
degraded, encroached for urban construction, silted, and
contaminated by sewage (Sundaresan 2011). Recent attempts in
a few lakes to explore public-private partnerships have also been
extremely controversial, leading to uncontrolled disruptive
activities such as motorized boating in some lakes, which have
been effectively challenged by litigations by local individuals and
nongovernmental organizations (Khandekar 2008).
Fig. 1. Distribution of lakes within and outside the city
(municipality of Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike),
Bangalore, India. The inset indicates the focal area of study
(see Fig. 2).
Here, we focus on the urbanizing peripheral areas of southeast
Bangalore. Some water bodies have been effectively restored and
managed by newly forged collaborations between citizens and
local government (Nagendra 2010). Others are extremely
polluted, and some have completely dried up and been encroached
for construction. We use seven lakes located here as a lens to
illustrate the usefulness of the SES framework as a diagnostic tool
to investigate the combination of factors that might indicate why
some locations have been successful while other lakes have
deteriorated in ecological condition and/or failed in generating
sufficient levels of collective action in the urban context.
Bangalore provides a challenging context within which to examine
these issues: a city struggling to deal with rapid urbanization,
socio-cultural change, and deterioration in natural resources.
METHODS
The seven lakes considered in this case study form part of a lake
network in the Koramangala-Challaghatta Valley of Bangalore
(Fig. 2). One of us (HN) has been involved with lake mapping,
assessment, restoration, and monitoring in this region since 2007,
engaging with informal, collaborative networks of local resident
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associations, researchers, and government organizations that have
organized a number of activities focused around lake
maintenance and restoration. Satellite remote-sensing data sets
and topographical maps have been used to generate a spatial data
set with information on the location, size, changes in size, and
connectivity of the larger sub-network of lakes within which these
are embedded, while personal observations and discussions with
local communities living around and working on these lakes have
provided a fairly detailed understanding of the social factors that
might affect collective action. Field visits to each of these lakes
have enabled qualitative recording of the ecological conditions
based on plant and bird diversity, and visual indications of
environmental disturbance, including observations of pollution,
encroachment, and debris dumping at these lakes (see Nagendra
et al. 2011 for further description of these lakes).
Fig. 2. Environmental and collective action outcomes between
2007 and 2012 for the seven lakes studied, Bangalore, India.
These lakes provide a useful set of contrasts in terms of challenges
and opportunities for urban collective action and restoration, size,
and condition (ecologically healthy to extremely polluted and
completely dry). The social attributes of the residents around
these lakes also differ, including substantial variation in the
number of actors, levels of trust, and the nature of operational
community rules. This divergence in social and ecological
attributes in a relatively small set of lakes that are located quite
near to each other enables us to obtain an in-depth understanding
of some critical variables in the SES framework in an urban
context. 
The SES framework identifies the broad characteristics of
Resource Systems and related Resource Units, Governance
Systems, and Actors that together affect the structure of Action
Situations leading to Interactions and Outcomes, as well as being
embedded in Social, Economic, and Political Settings, and with
Related Ecosystems (see Fig. 3). Within each of these broad
structures are second-tier variables (Table 1). Within each second-
tier variable are third-tier variables, and frequently, fourth- and
fifth-tier variables.
Fig. 3. Basic structure of the social-ecological system
framework. Source: McGinnis and Ostrom (2014).
The SES framework identifies a large number of second- and
third-tier variables. This nested hierarchy of variables was not
proposed with the intent to suggest that all variables are relevant
for all cases. Rather, analysts might find the SES framework
helpful as a diagnostic tool that enables them to define clearly
variables of interest and organize them into connected groups, as
well as to ensure that they consider a broad universe of potentially
applicable variables before identifying specific factors that are
indicated as important based on existing field knowledge,
previous research, or theoretical formulations. 
In selecting the specific SES variables for our study (Table 1), our
initial focus was on a subset of 10 second-tier variables identified
by Ostrom (2009) to be associated with self-organization because
self-organization forms an important focus of our study. Of these,
based on our knowledge of the field context, five variables were
considered relevant: RS3, size of resource system; A1, number of
relevant actors; A5, leadership/entrepreneurship; A6, norms/
social capital; and A8, importance of resource. Here, we define
social capital following Ostrom and Ahn (2003) as based on three
attributes that are critical for research on collective action, namely,
trustworthiness, the existence of networks, and the existence of
rules and norms that enhance the ability of individuals to solve
collective-action challenges. It should be noted that these differ,
for instance, from definitions of social capital provided by other
social scientists such as Bourdieu (1986) and Putnam (1993), who
additionally consider the presence of durable, institutionalized
networks that provide links with other institutions such as
government agencies (Portes 1998). 
The remaining five variables were not relevant to this context or
provided redundant information. RS5, productivity of the
system, tends to be strongly related with size and environmental
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Table 1. Explanation of variables in the social-ecological system (SES) framework, and description of the nine SES variables and two
outcome criteria used in our study of lakes in Bangalore, India. Boldface font indicates variables included in our analysis; asterisks
indicate factors suggested as important for collective action by Ostrom (2009:421).
 
Category
Variable
code
Variable name Used in this study Reason for inclusion/exclusion
Social, Economic, and Political Settings (S)
S1 Economic
development
No No appreciable variation across different lakes within the study
S2 Demographic trends No Same as above
S3 Political stability No Same as above
S4 Other governance
systems
No Same as above
S5 Markets No Same as above
S6 Media organizations No Same as above
S7 Technology No Same as above
 
Related Ecosystems (ECO)
ECO1 Climate patterns No Same as above
ECO2 Pollution patterns No Same as above
ECO3 Flows into and out
of focal SES
 
No Same as above
Resource Systems (RS)
RS1 Sector (e.g., water,
forests, pasture, fish)
No All lakes belong to the same sector
RS2 Clarity of system
boundaries
No appreciable variation across different lakes within the study
RS3* Size of resource
system
Yes Identified as an important variable influencing collective action by Ostrom (2009); there
is substantial variation in size across lakes; size is a known important factor related to
lake position (upstream or downstream), lake productivity, and other factors related to
lake ecological condition in the study area
RS4 Human-constructed
facilities
No No appreciable variation across different lakes within the study
RS5* Productivity of the
system
No Identified as an important variable influencing collective action by Ostrom (2009);
however, although there is substantial variation in the productivity of the system
across different lakes within the study, this variation is strongly linked with variable
RS3 (size of resource system), which is already included in the analysis
RS6 Equilibrium
properties
No Although there is substantial variation in equilibrium properties across different lakes
within the study, this variation is strongly linked with variable RS3 (size of resource
system), which is already included in the analysis
RS7* Predictability of
system dynamics
No Identified as an important variable influencing collective action by Ostrom (2009);
however, although there is substantial variation in the predictability of system
dynamics across different lakes within the study, this variation is strongly linked with
variable RS3 (size of resource system), which is already included in the analysis
RS8 Storage
characteristics
No Although there is substantial variation across different lakes within the study, this
variation is strongly linked with variable RS3 (size of resource system), which is
already included in the analysis
RS9 Location No The main parameter of location relevant to lake ecological condition is whether the
lake is located upstream or downstream; this parameter is strongly linked with
variable RS3 (size of resource system), which is already included in the analysis
 
Resource Units (RU)
RU1* Resource unit
mobility
No Identified as an important variable influencing collective action by Ostrom (2009);
however, lakes in the Bangalore city jurisdiction are not managed with especial
attention to the availability of resource units (e.g., fish); thus, RU-related second-tier
variables were not considered in this study
 
RU2 Growth or
replacement rate
No Same as above
RU3 Interaction between
resource units
No Same as above
(con'd)
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RU4 Economic value No Same as above
RU5 Number of units No Same as above
RU6 Distinctive
characteristics
No Same as above
RU7 Spatial or temporal
distribution
 
No Same as above
Actors (A)
A1* Number of relevant
actors
Yes Identified as an important variable influencing collective action by Ostrom (2009), as
well as being important in the study area
A2 Socioeconomic
attributes
Yes (third-tier variable
A2a “Socioeconomic
groups excluded” is
examined within A2)
Identified as an important variable influencing collective action in the literature;
important for the study area, where there are differences in the degree to which different
socioeconomic groups have been included in or excluded from lake use and management,
thus providing a specific aspect of socioeconomic attributes; this aspect was examined
as a third-tier variable within A2
A3 History or past
experiences
No No appreciable variation across different lakes within the study
A4 Location No Same as above
A5* Leadership/
entrepreneurship
Yes Identified as an important variable influencing collective action by Ostrom (2009);
specifically important for the study area
A6* Norms (trust-
reciprocity)/social
capital
Yes Identified as an important variable influencing collective action by Ostrom (2009);
specifically important for the study area
A7* Knowledge of SES/
mental models
No Identified as an important variable influencing collective action by Ostrom (2009);
however, there is no appreciable variation across different lakes within the study
A8* Importance of
resource (dependence)
Yes Identified as an important variable influencing collective action by Ostrom (2009);
specifically important for the study area
A9 Technologies
available
No No appreciable variation across different lakes within the study
 
Governance Systems (GS)
GS1 Government
organizations
No Same as above
GS2 Nongovernmental
organizations
No Same as above
GS3 Network structure No Same as above
GS4 Property-rights
systems
No Same as above
GS5 Operational-choice
rules
Yes Identified as an important variable influencing collective action in the literature;
important for the study area, where there are substantial differences in the presence and
nature of operational rules developed and implemented by communities around different
lakes
GS6 Collective-choice
rules
No No appreciable variation across different lakes within the study
GS7 Constitutional-
choice rules
No Same as above
GS8* Monitoring and
sanctioning rules
No Identified as an important variable influencing collective action by Ostrom (2009);
however, formal functioning rules for monitoring and sanctioning are not in place in
these lakes, whose formal governance is still largely dominated by state institutions
 
Interactions (I)
I1 Harvesting No No appreciable variation across different lakes within the study
I2 Information sharing No Same as above
I3 Deliberation
processes
No Same as above
I4 Conflicts No Same as above
I5 Investment activities No Same as above
I6 Lobbying activities No Same as above
I7 Self-organizing
activities
No Same as above
I8 Networking activities Yes (third-tier variable I8a
“Networking with
government” is examined
within I8)
Identified as an important variable influencing collective action in the literature;
important for this study area, where there are substantial differences in the degree of
networking between local communities and government departments across different
lakes within the study; this aspect was examined as a third-tier variable within I8
I9 Monitoring activities Yes Identified as an important variable influencing collective action in the literature;
important for this study area, where there is substantial variation in the presence or
absence of informal mechanisms implemented by local communities for monitoring the
lake
(con'd)
Ecology and Society 19(2): 67
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol19/iss2/art67/
I10 Evaluative activities No No evaluative activities systematically conducted across lakes within the study
 
Outcome criteria (O)
O1 Social performance
measures (e.g.,
efficiency, equity,
accountability,
sustainability)
Yes An important social outcome criterion for this social-ecological study is provided by the
degree of collective action
O2 Ecological
performance
measures (e.g.,
overharvested,
resilience,
biodiversity,
sustainability)
Yes An important ecological outcome criterion for this social-ecological study is provided by
the environmental condition of lakes
O3 Externalities to other
SESs
No Externalities to other SESs were not considered within this study, which focused only
on collective action around the management of individual lakes
 
condition in Bangalore’s lakes (Nagendra 2010). Three variables
did not vary appreciably across our subset of seven lakes, making
them less useful for this study: RS7, predictability of system
dynamics; RU1, resource unit mobility; and A7, knowledge of
SES/mental models. Variable GS6, collective-choice rules, was not
relevant to our study because we focus on lakes within the city,
where there are no formal rules dictating collective-choice
outcomes. This process of selection thus provided us with five
variables important for understanding self-organization. 
We next examined literature applying the SES framework to
collective action in a somewhat similar context of water-based
commons, but with a focus on fisheries (Basurto and Ostrom 2009,
Gutiérrez et al. 2011). Based on this, we identified one additional
second-tier variable as important: GS5, operational-choice rules.
Other literature also points to the importance of monitoring and
sanctioning for self-organization and collective action (Ostrom
2005). In our study, formal, functional rules for monitoring and
sanctioning (GS8) are not in place; however, some communities
have developed and put into place informal mechanisms for
monitoring (I9), which we consequently included in our study. 
Finally, in further development of the SES framework, we added
a consideration of two third-tier variables that have been
demonstrated to be important in previous studies of urban lake
commons in Bangalore (e.g., Environment Support Group 2009,
Nagendra 2010, D’Souza and Nagendra 2011, Sundaresan 2011).
Socioeconomic heterogeneity is an important theoretical variable
for understanding self-organization (Poteete and Ostrom 2004).
Previous research has indicated that the exclusion of specific
socioeconomic groups such as fishers, fodder collectors, and
migrant workers from collective action affects self-organization
in the context of urban SESs, particularly with reference to urban
water bodies (D’Souza and Nagendra 2011, Ellis 2011). This
constitutes a specific sub-type of the second-tier variable A2,
socioeconomic attributes of actors. Thus, we defined and
incorporated a third-tier variable, A2a, into our analysis,
describing whether specific socioeconomic groups have been
excluded from the planning process. We added another third-tier
variable, I8a, that characterizes a type of networking (with
government) because previous research in urban contexts has
demonstrated that networking with state organizations can be
critical in many instances for effective collective action (Stoker
2000). 
Thus, a final set of seven second-tier and three third-tier variables
were used. We examined two kinds of Outcomes. O1 describes
the social outcomes of the lake, which we define here as the extent
of collective action by residents working together for lake
restoration. We also described the lakes in terms of O2, their
environmental condition (Appendix 1). 
The SES matrix (Table 2) provides a temporal snapshot of selected
social and ecological variables at the time of conducting the
analysis. However, the social-ecological contexts and conditions
experienced by these lakes are dynamic. Some of these lakes have
changed fairly rapidly in recent years, especially the two recently
restored lakes, Kaikondanahalli and Ambalipura. Thus, in
addition to providing a one-time snapshot of the variables in the
SES matrix, we also indicate some of the changes that have taken
place over time in the table by adding + or − to cells for which
the direction of the variable has changed in recent years.
RESULTS
The different SES variables can be described in terms of their
potential action as barriers or facilitators of collective action and
environmental restoration of lakes (Fig. 4). These variables
provide us with useful insights into the design principles (Ostrom
2005) that can influence the likelihood of a lake to be the location
of collective action and to undergo positive changes in
environmental quality. Our analysis thus attempts to identify
these variables (Fig. 4). 
Lake size (RS3) constitutes a significant physical-ecological
barrier to restoration. Bellandur and Varthur are among the
largest lakes in Bangalore, collecting water, sewage outflow, and
industrial effluents from a large watershed. Restoration of these
lakes will be expensive because of the sheer volume of water
received by these lakes and the technical and ecological challenges
for restoration at this scale. For Agara and Kaikondanahalli,
which represent mid-sized lakes, and Ambalipura, Parappana
Agrahara, and Mestripalya, which are small lakes, estimated and
actual costs of restoration have been much lower (Bruhat
Bangalore Mahanagara Palike 2010), and these lakes represent a
more manageable challenge. 
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Table 2. Variables posited to have affected collective action and ecological performance between 2007 and 2012 for seven urban lakes
in Bangalore, India. Boldface font indicates the two lakes for which both outcome variables showed an improvement over time.
 
Lake
Category Variable Agara Ambalipura Bellandur Kaikondana­
halli
Mestripalya Parappana
Agrahara
Varthur
Resource
Systems (RS)
RS3, size of
resource
system
Moderate Small Large Moderate Small Small Large
A1, number
of actors
Moderate Moderate Large Moderate Small Moderate Large
A2-a,
socioeconomic
groups
excluded
Yes No No No Yes No No
A5,
leadership
Lacking Present Present Present Present Absent Absent
A6, norms of
trust, social
capital
Low High Moderate High Low High Moderate
A8,
importance
of resource,
dependence
Low Moderate (+) Moderate Moderate (+) Low High Moderate
Actors (A)
Governance
Systems
(GS)
GS5,
operational
community
rules
Absent Present (+) Absent Present (+) Present Absent (−) Absent
I8a,
networking
with
government
Low High (+) Low High (+) Moderate Low Low
I9, informal
norms for
monitoring
Absent Present (+) Absent Present (+) Absent Absent (−) Absent
Interactions
(I)
O1, social
performance
measure
(collective
action)
Moderate High (+) High High (+) High Low (−) Moderate
O2,
environmental
performance
measure
(lake)
Low High (+) Low High (+) Low Low (−) Low
Outcomes
(O)
Note: (+) and (−) indicate recent changes from 2007 to 2012 in the direction indicated.
Social barriers to restoration can include the existence of a large
(chaotic) or very small (insufficient for effective action) number
of actors (A1), exclusion of specific socioeconomic groups (A2a),
lack of leadership (A5), and/or low social capital (A6). Social
barriers to restoration and maintenance are lowest in
Kaikondanahalli and Ambalipura, where the diversity of actors
is moderate, there is minimal exclusion of groups, and social
capital is particularly strong with good leadership, following the
recent process of lake restoration through community
involvement (Amilineni 2011a,b). The set of actors is very large
in Bellandur and Varthur, including the original villages, urban
residents, industries, and hospitals located around these lakes.
However, on the positive side, there has been no specific exclusion
of local communities from planning, and at least in Bellandur,
social capital and leadership are high, emanating from the original
residents of these areas. In comparison, Mestripalya represents a
complex case for restoration, having a very small set of actors
involved, with original village inhabitants largely excluded from
planning, although with high social capital within this group and
strong leadership (Sundaresan 2011).
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Fig. 4. Schematic diagram of the social-ecological system
barriers and facilitating variables that influence collective
action and environmental restoration of lakes in Bangalore,
India.
Dependence on the lake (A8) can provide a nucleating point for
restoration and maintenance (Ostrom 2005) that can overcome
physical, ecological, and social barriers. In Parappana Agrahara,
the local village was, until recently, highly dependent on the lake
for agriculture, cattle fodder collection, cattle washing, and
groundwater recharge. In Bellandur, Varthur, and Parappana
Agrahara, levels of motivation to restore the lakes are high
because of moderate dependence on the lakes for agriculture and
cattle fodder (although these dependencies have decreased over
time), as well as for groundwater through wells located adjacent
to these lakes. In Ambalipura and Kaikondanahalli, there are
moderate levels of dependence for urban exercise, recreation, and
groundwater recharge. Dependence is low in Agara, where the
lake has been degraded for the past few years, as well as in
Mestripalya, where the lakebed has been dry for decades. 
The existence of operational community rules managing the types
of activities permitted in the lake (GS5), informal norms related
to monitoring (I9), and networking with government agencies
(I8a) constitute institutional variables that can be critical for lake
restoration and/or maintenance. All three are present in only two
of the seven lakes: Ambalipura and Kaikondanahalli. Following
restoration, the community association maintaining the lakes has
developed an informal and evolving set of operational community
rules, as well as informal norms of lake monitoring. This is missing
from the other lakes, although such rules and norms are likely to
have been in place during earlier times, when the local
communities had greater control over lake management.
Ambalipura and Kaikondanahalli have been especially successful
at networking with the BBMP Lakes Division over the past five
years for lake restoration and maintenance. 
In terms of Outcome variables (O1), collective action is high in
Ambalipura, Bellandur, Kaikondanahalli, and Mestripalya;
moderate in Agara and Varthur, where some efforts have been
made by local groups to protect and restore the lake; and low in
Parappana Agrahara, where local residents have tried to organize
to protest against the pollution of their lake by the Bangalore
Central Jail, but have been unable to do this effectively and in a
sustained manner. Ambalipura and Kaikondanahalli are high in
environmental condition (O2; see Appendix 1), whereas the other
five lakes have low environmental condition. Since writing this
article, however, efforts toward restoration of Agara lake have
been initiated by local residents, providing an indication of
potential further improvements in the condition of this lake.
Further details on the SES attributes of these seven lakes are
provided in Appendix 2. 
Following Ostrom (2007), we do not use the SES variables to
attribute causation of either collective action or environmental
restoration as a consequence of specific variables present in these
lakes. Direct establishment of causal relationships is challenging;
similar to other complex systems, there are nonlinear interactions
between variables, and many of these variables may be important
or necessary, but not sufficient, and thus difficult to attribute
causality to them (Ostrom 2007, 2009). Thus, this analysis
provides an important step forward toward the understanding of
how to achieve long-term sustainability of collectively managed
lakes in the Bangalore context, but further work is required to
understand relationships between different sets of variables and
to posit potential causal relationships.
DISCUSSION
We describe the first application of the SES framework developed
by Ostrom (2007, 2009) in an urban context, enabling us to assess
the impact of the combination of nine different variables in
determining the extent of collective action and positive
environmental outcomes. We demonstrate the process that can be
used for selection of SES variables relevant to a particular system
(Table 1) and demonstrate how the framework can be further
detailed to specify and examine the role of third-tier variables.
Such details will be important in different contexts as the
framework is developed further and applied to different SESs. 
We find that only two of the seven lakes studied (Ambalipura and
Kaikondanahalli) were successful in regard to both the extent of
collective action and the level of ecological performance. While
the size of Ambalipura was small and that of Kaikondanahalli
was moderate, they shared similar rankings in all other variables:
A1, number of actors was moderate; A2a, socioeconomic groups
were not excluded; A5, local leadership was present; A6, trust and
social capital were present; A8, the resource was moderately
important to residents; GS5, operational community rules were
present; I8a, networking with government officials occurred; and
I9, informal norms for monitoring local uses of the lake were
developed. 
Comparison with the two lakes (Bellandur and Mestripalya) that
have a high degree of collective action yet do not have positive
ecological outcomes could help understand further the role of
specific SES variables. The combination of barrier factors such
as large size and high degree of pollution in Bellandur and low
social capital and low dependence on the lake in Mestripalya
seems to have played a role in limiting the transformation from
collective action to positive environmental outcomes in these
challenging urban conditions. Since writing this article, however,
restoration has commenced in Mestripalya lake, due, in large part,
to constant efforts of the local community around this lake. 
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One additional variable that seems to be important is I8a.
Networking between communities and the government appears
to be an important variable that has an effect on the likelihood
of collective action resulting in improved ecological condition of
urban lakes, as witnessed by the fact that this variable is present
in both lakes with high collective action and high ecological
performance (Ambalipura and Kaikondanahalli) but lower or
missing in lakes with moderate to high collective action but low
ecological performance (Bellandur and Mestripalya). Bellandur
is the largest lake in Bangalore, and a variety of actors and
agencies are involved in polluting this lake, making the process of
networking with the government an especially challenging task.
In Mestripalya, a group of prominent local citizens formed
contacts with the government, but as of 2012 were unable to make
headway in initiating the process of lake restoration. Although
newspaper reports have mentioned commencement of restoration
in Bellandur over the past three years, no concrete action has
taken place thus far. It is likely, although by no means certain,
that Bellandur, like Mestripalya, will be restored to a better
ecological condition in a few years as collective action by a
diversity of local actors begins to make headway in spurring the
administrative agencies involved in lake maintenance to take
action. 
Why is this important? Challenges of lake restoration include
arresting land encroachment, clearing blocked inflow and outflow
water channels, and preventing the continued dumping of solid
waste and inflow of sewage and industrial effluents. Rejuvenation
of a polluted lake also often requires the diversion of sewage
through creation of a new channel that bypasses the lake, as well
as dredging of the lakebed to remove accumulated silt and toxic
waste. These activities are beyond the scope of citizen groups to
manage unaided and require the involvement of a number of
government agencies. While government agencies have the legal
authority to prevent unwanted activities and harmful use of the
lake, they may not know what is occurring at different locations
soon enough to act in a timely manner. Further, local officials are
often subject to governance incentives as well as incentives of
political economy and rent-seeking that ensure that they are
primarily accountable to higher officials or vested interests such
as real estate agencies, rather than downward accountability to
local communities or marginalized groups. Collective action,
coupled with effective use of public opinion mobilized through
actors such as the media, and with legal recourses through Public
Interest Litigations, can help strengthen downward accountability,
ensuring the effectiveness of monitoring against infractions and
sanctioning of repeat-offenders. An example of this can be found
in Kaikondanahalli lake, where repeated inflows of sewage from
a neighboring apartment were finally addressed because of action
by the BBMP, but which required constant follow up from the
local citizens association (Amilineni 2011a). 
Lake restoration efforts are also likely to be better designed to
suit local social-ecological conditions when there is cooperation
between local actors and government agencies. Government
agencies such as the BBMP and BDA tend to contract out the
task of lake restoration project reports to consultancy agencies,
who often provide cookie-cutter or blueprint proposals for
rejuvenation that fail to take into account the unique social-
ecological context and requirements of each lake (Gandhi 2011).
Citizen groups, in contrast, have in some cases networked very
successfully with researchers, naturalists, and other technical
experts to draft restoration plans tailored for each lake that take
into account its specific social, institutional, and ecological setting
(Nagendra et al. 2011). Thus, collaborations between local actors
and government agencies can also be very fruitful for lake
restoration, with local actors supplying the local knowledge about
the lake and providing inputs about their requirements, while
government agencies and their consultants provide the technical,
financial, and manpower resources necessary for the task of
dredging, bund building, and restoration. Local groups can also
be very critical in monitoring the process of restoration and
ensuring that the lake remains in healthy condition after
rejuvenation (Amilineni 2011b).
SPECULATION
Thus far, we have discussed the potential for lake restoration in
polluted peri-urban lakes, but to maintain lakes in good
environmental condition and to ensure sustained collective
action, sustained efforts at monitoring and maintenance will be
required. In the Bangalore context, public interest litigations and
active engagement by civic action groups, among which the
Environment Support Group has played an especially prominent
role, as well as positive action by the Karnataka courts, have been
very critical in lakes being legally protected from encroachment
or development for any purpose other than that of a public
commons (Khandekar 2008, Environment Support Group 2009,
High Court of Karnataka 2011). A legislative task force has also
systematically documented widespread encroachments of lakes
and water bodies for legal action by the government
(Balasubramanian 2011). Thus, inputs from a diverse array of
actors, including government agencies, citizen groups,
researchers, naturalists, civic action groups, legislative groups, and
the court, have been important in various ways such as for lake
protection, rejuvenation, and maintenance. Concerns of equity
and representation are important, and previous research shows
that urban collective action can sometimes lead to the exclusion
of certain groups (D’Souza and Nagendra 2011, Ellis 2011,
Sundaresan 2011). 
Other factors that have not been addressed in this analysis could
also play important roles, for instance, differences in the level of
encroachment of freshwater inflow channels into different lakes
or the adequacy of infrastructure such as wastewater diversion
channels. Thus, as indicated, this analysis does not seek to
establish firm causality. Rather, given the limited exploratory
nature of this analysis, we wish to identify potential factors that
could be important for better institutional design, which can then
provide insights for future study. 
Based on the results from this initial study, we have initiated a
quantitative application of the SES framework to a larger set of
approximately 80 lakes in the southeastern section of Bangalore
to gain a fuller picture of the relevant social and ecological
conditions and the set of factors associated with building
collective action among residents and with improved ecological
performance. We also intend to investigate the relationship
between the two outcome variables in more depth, which will add
further nuance to our understanding of the SES framework.
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CONCLUSIONS
We applied the SES framework to examine the multiple social and
ecological factors that potentially affect the level of collective
action and ecological outcomes of seven of the many lakes located
in Bangalore, India. Of the seven lakes, only two were highly
successful in regard to both the extent of collective action and the
level of ecological performance. While the size of Ambalipura
was small and that of Kaikondanahalli was moderate, the two
highly successful cases shared similar ranking in regard to all other
variables. Unfortunately, the challenge of cleaning up urban lakes
after many decades of pollution is very difficult without effective
interaction with various governmental units. In both Ambalipura
and Kaikondanahalli, the leaders of local groups were able to
network with government officials to clean up their lakes.
Leadership and trust were important in both of these lakes, as
has also been demonstrated in other cases of collective action for
environmental (sewage) management in the peri-urban areas of
Chennai, India (Baud and Dhanalakshmi 2007), and in the case
of co-managed fisheries around the world (Gutiérrez et al. 2011). 
Our analysis generates several important lessons. First, it
illustrates the usefulness of the SES framework in examining the
combination of variables that makes a collective difference in
affecting the outcomes of collective action and ecological
performance. The framework provides us with a structured way
to compare across cases with successful and unsuccessful
outcomes to identify combinations of factors that act as barriers
and facilitators for collective action and environmental
restoration. In the peri-urban context, which poses particular
challenges for collective action due to a number of factors,
including heterogeneity of actors, a high degree of institutional
fragmentation, and the dominance of statutory institutions
(Stoker 2000, Swallow et al. 2006), our study provides insights for
future participatory institutional co-design. 
The results illustrate the need for polycentric arrangements
(McGinnis 1999, 2011) whereby local residents are able to
organize in diverse ways that reflect their own problems and
capabilities but often need to work jointly with larger-scale
governments to solve technical problems requiring changes in
major engineering works as well as acquiring good scientific
information (Baud and Dhanalakshmi 2007). The sustainable use
and management of inland freshwater lakes in south India are
associated with very high transaction costs (Ananda et al. 2006). 
Our research demonstrates an approach of designing
participatory institutions for lake governance that has been
ignored in the urban context by many planners and policymakers
but that can be especially important in rapidly developing cities
with a large peri-urban fringe such as Bangalore (Mukhija 2005,
Ananda et al. 2006, Colding 2012). Such an approach can reduce
transaction costs for city governments by actively engaging local
communities in processes that include coordination of collective
activities, design of inclusive and locally suited ecological and
social restoration goals, and planning and enforcement of
regulations limiting access and withdrawal (Colding et al. 2006).
At a time when many city governments are facing financial and
administrative challenges that limit their ability to regulate and
maintain urban commons (Lee and Webster 2006), a model of
public-community partnerships could provide a more inclusive,
equitable, and sustainable institutional alternative. This is an
aspect that needs significant further attention; the attention of a
majority of urban planners and scholars has remained almost
exclusively on privatization, and there is limited research
investigating the potential of alternate approaches that build on
cooperative action in the urban context (Mukhija 2005). 
Concurrently, across several countries in Asia, examples of
participatory governance are beginning to emerge that involve
engagement between urban communities and city government,
introducing new polycentric institutional approaches that can be
used as a foundation for practical lessons in new institutional
design (Leonhardt 2012). Such partnerships typically have several
important characteristics (Baud and Dhanalakshmi 2007). These
include the existence of a long-term relationship that results in
benefits to all actors, although these benefits need not be equal,
and the existence of bargaining processes between actors that can
result in instances of conflict as well as cooperation. Particularly
important, as our research demonstrates, is the presence of
effective networking between local communities and city
government. This requires greater downward accountability.
Diverse approaches can be envisaged to support increased
downward accountability, including the provisioning of increased
incentives for local officials who engage with communities such
as through the incorporation of community feedback in
performance reviews or through media publicity for motivated
officials; the strengthening of independence and investigative
powers for local ombudsman organizations such as the
Lokayukta, an anti-corruption ombudsman; and the
strengthening of alternative mechanisms for rapid settlement of
grievances, such as the Lok Adalat or people’s courts.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/6582
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Appendix 1. 
 
The seven lakes in our study were categorized into two groups (low and high) based on their 
environmental condition, as described further in the table below.  
 
Lake Restored 
between 2009 
and 2012 
Source  Details 
Agara No High Court of 
Karnataka 
(2011) 
Categorized as a Class D lake, 
i.e. polluted  
Ambalipura Yes BBMP Lakes 
Division 
Dry lake prior to restoration. 
Following restoration, lake 
water quality is considered 
high, per the BBMP Lakes 
Division  
Bellandur No High Court of 
Karnataka 
(2011) 
Categorized as a Class D lake, 
i.e. polluted 
Kaikondanahalli Yes High Court of 
Karnataka 
(2011) and 
BBMP Lakes 
Division 
Categorized as a Class D lake, 
i.e. polluted, prior to 
restoration. Following 
restoration, water quality in the 
lake is considered good, per 
information from BBMP Lakes 
Division.  
Mestripalya No Field visit Completely dry lake, thus 
categorized as in low 
environmental condition. 
Parappana 
Agrahara 
No High Court of 
Karnataka 
(2011) 
Categorized as a Class D lake, 
i.e. polluted 
Varthur No High Court of 
Karnataka 
(2011) 
Categorized as a Class E lake, 
i.e. polluted 
 
Appendix 2.  
 
Detailed description of the SES attributes of the seven lakes studied in Bangalore, focusing 
largely on the time period between 2007 and 2012.  
 
In the case of urban lakes, the variable that varied the most between different lakes was their size 
(RS3). Bellandur and Varthur are among the largest lakes in Bangalore, collecting water from a 
number of lakes in the network; indeed, Bellandur is the largest lake in the city limits, with an 
area just over 360 ha, while Varthur Lake is over 120 ha. The estimated cost of restoration of 
these lakes is Rs. 900,000,000 (approximately USD 16, 556, 291 at current rates of exchange) 
and Rs. 150,000,000 (approximately USD 2, 759, 381) respectively (BBMP 2010). Agara and 
Kaikondanahalli are moderate in size and extend to about 20 ha, while Ambalipura, Parappana 
Agrahara, and Mestripalya are small lakes with areas of 3–6 ha.  Ambalipura and 
Kaikondanahalli have been recently restored at an approximate cost of Rs. 15,200,000 
(approximately USD 279,617) and Rs. 108,500,000 (approximately USD 1,995,952) respectively 
(BBMP 2010), and do not have substantial amounts of sewage currently.  
 
The number of actors (A2) is lowest in Mestripalya, with exclusion of socio-economic groups 
(A2a). This former lake has dried completely, and was converted into a park and nursery, with 
some encroachments for construction. A Public Interest Litigation filed by local residents and 
pursued diligently over a couple of decades resulted in a court ruling that the area was a lake, and 
could not be developed for any other purpose. A relatively small and reasonably cohesive group 
of local residents have worked with technical experts, and developed a plan for restoration that 
incorporates social and ecological considerations. This group is largely comprised of a small 
group of middle class and affluent residents, and does not include the inhabitants of adjacent 
villages in their deliberations. Restoration of the lake has recently begun in 2013 and is now in 
progress. 
 
In Ambalipura, Kaikondanahalli, and Parappana Agrahara, the group of actors is moderate in 
size, and includes the original residents of the villages around these lakes – representing a 
diversity of uses including commercial and subsistence fishing, grazing, fodder collection, cattle 
washing, clothes washing, and firewood collection – and urban residents, both poor and wealthy, 
who access the lake for a range of purposes, from washing of clothes to urban recreation and 
exercise. The set of actors expands further in Bellandur and Varthur to additionally include a 
number of industries and some hospitals located around these lakes, which also impact the lake 
by polluting it and encroaching on the lake bed as well as the lake channels that drain into and 
out of the lake. Attempts at planning have included a diversity of actors including original village 
inhabitants, as well as actors belonging to educational institutions, and corporate establishments.  
 
Strong local leadership (A5) exists in all four lakes where collective-action levels are high – 
Ambalipura, Bellandur, Kaikondanahalli, and Mestripalya. The leadership does not vest with one 
strong (and therefore possibly autocratic) individual, but instead, a relatively small group of 
individuals have led different initiatives at different points of time, who may interact informally 
(as in the case of Kaikondanahalli Lake) or through a tightly linked, formalized network with 
defined responsibilities (as in the case of Mestripalya). In Agara, Parappana Agrahara, and 
Varthur, there have been sporadic efforts by influential local residents and groups to organize 
protests, but in Parappana Agrahara and Varthur these have not been sustained due to a lack of 
influential, widely accepted leadership. In Agara, a recent initiative by local residents in 2013  
has led to cleaning up of the periphery of the lake, and the initiation of a new cycle of lake 
protection and restoration. 
 
Norms of trust and social capital (A6) are low in Agara, Bellandur, and Varthur, where 
connections have not been established between older residents from different socioeconomic 
groups, and between residents from surrounding villages and relatively recent urban residents. In 
Mestripalya, although the local residents’ association has worked together to reclaim the area 
from encroachment and to devise a community plan for restoration, there are some conflicts 
between members of this group, thus social capital is characterized as moderate in this lake. 
Ambalipura represents a landlocked lake surrounded by high-end apartments and layouts, and 
the social capital there is quite high. In Parappana Agrahara, at the periphery of the city where 
urbanization is relatively limited, the opposite holds true – social capital within the village is 
fairly high, and the involvement of urban residents is fairly low. In Kaikondanahalli, the group 
that works for restoration of the lake includes representation from older villages as well as from 
more recent houses and apartments, and social capital can be characterized as high.  
 
Current dependence on the lake (A8) is low in Agara, where the lake has been degraded for the 
past few years, as well as in Mestripalya, where the lake bed has been dry for decades. In 
Ambalipura and Kaikondanahalli, the lake has become an important location for urban exercise 
and recreation in recent months, following their restoration. These lakes are also important for 
restoring the rapidly depleting water tables in this area. Their dependence on these lakes is, 
therefore, moderate. In Bellandur and Varthur, although recreation and exercise are not possible 
due to the high levels of pollution, the villages near these lakes depend on them for agriculture 
and cattle fodder (although these dependencies have decreased over time). Their drinking water 
also comes from wells that are linked to these lakes through a shared groundwater table, which 
results in pollution of their groundwater. Parappana Agrahara Lake has become extremely 
polluted in recent years due to sewage from the adjacent Bangalore Central Jail, but the village 
still depends on this water for agriculture, cattle fodder collection, cattle washing and other 
domestic uses. There are a number of wells linked to the groundwater supply that the adjacent 
villages rely on that have become polluted as a consequence of the lake pollution. Thus, the 
dependence of the residents surrounding these three lakes is extremely high.  
 
In Ambalipura and Kaikondanahalli, just prior to restoration, there were no commonly accepted 
operational community rules (GS5) that placed a limit on the types of activities permitted in the 
lake. After restoration, however, the community associations maintaining the lake have 
developed an informal and evolving set of adaptive guidelines that indicate, for instance, how 
much fodder can be extracted from the lake during which seasons, and limit activities such as 
washing of clothes, dumping of solid waste, and input of sewage. In Agara, Bellandur, and 
Varthur, there is a current absence of operational rules, although such rules may have been in 
place earlier. In Mestripalya, since the lake bed was dry for several years and the park in 
existence in this area was overgrown with weeds and rarely visited, there was no need for the 
development or enforcement of operational rules. Once restoration is complete, this may change. 
In Parappana Agrahara, although there were operational rules and norms in place until recently 
that indicated permissible types of use and extraction by adjacent villages in line, many of these 
practices such as fishing and washing of cattle have been discontinued or heavily scaled down 
after the lake became polluted, and such use of the lake is so infrequent that again, there is no 
need for the maintenance or enforcement of operational rules.  
 
Ambalipura and Kaikondanahalli have been especially successful at networking with 
government agencies (I8a). These are the two lakes where restoration has proceeded in a manner 
that pays attention to the social as well as the ecological requirements of residents, and where 
ecological outcomes are highest – indicating the importance of this variable. Informal norms 
related to monitoring (I9) are only in existence in two of the seven lakes – Ambalipura and 
Kaikondanahalli.  
 
In terms of Outcome variables (O1), collective action is high in Ambalipura, Bellandur, 
Kaikondanahalli, and Mestripalya; moderate in Agara and Varthur, where some efforts have 
been made by local groups to protect and restore the lake; and low in Parappana Agrahara, where 
local residents have tried to organize to protest against the pollution of their lake by the 
Bangalore Central Jail, but have been unable to do this effectively and in a sustained manner. 
Ambalipura and Kaikondanahalli are relatively high in environmental condition (O2). The other 
lakes are all low in environmental condition, as explained further in Appendix 1.   
